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18 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Members, Guided Missile and Astronautics

Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT

: Terms of Reference, NIE 11-60: Trenús In

Soviet Military Policy and Capabilities

Through 1970.

REFERENCE

Attached Terms of Reference

- 1. It is requested that contributions on this subject be provided the GMAIC Secretariat by 10 December 1959. This is not much time but in order to get our contributions to ONE by 4 January 1960, we will have to make such a date. (Christmas and New Years holidays considered.)
- 2. It is pointed out that this is a contribution to an estimate, not a draft estimate. Therefore, it is much more informal and we do not need to discuss each and every word as was done for NIE 11-5-59. Further, I doubt that we could come up with specific tables of missile characteristics, but instead, will use paragraph type descriptions. For trends and exotic weapons, please give a discussion of the reasons for the conclusions. No specific assignment of missiles to agencies is planned, as I hope for several contributions in most of the subjects.
- 3. The briefing on ZEUS, next week, should be of some assistance in this estimate.
- 4. After the contributions are received, the Secretariat will prepare a draft for circulation for subsequent GMAIC consideration.

EARL MEFARLAND, JR

Colonel, USAF

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 November 1959

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR) Colonel J. W. Strain, USA (ACSI) Captain A. D. Kilmartin, USN (ONI) Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF (AFCIN 2B3) Colonel J. H. McCann, USAF (J-2, The Joint Staff)

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Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (080) Chairman, JAEIC Chairman, GMAIC

Chairman, SIC

SUBJECT

: Terms of Reference, NIE 11-60: TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AND CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1970

- 1. Forwarded herewith are the terms of reference for NIE 11-60 as approved at a meeting of the USIB representatives on 16 November 1959.
- 2. It is requested that agencies and USIB subcommittees make contributions within their competence, these contributions to be received in this office by close of business Monday 4 January 1960.
- 3. It should be noted that the representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, reserves his position on these terms of reference.

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Deputy Assistant Director National Estimates

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 November 1959

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-60: TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AND CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1970

## THE PROBLEM

To estimate trends in Soviet military strengths and capabilities in the period 1964-1970.\*

#### SCOPE NOTE

Soviet military trends will be influenced by a complex interaction of nonmilitary factors. Among the more important will be trends in the international situation, successes or failures in developing a stable, noncoercive relationship with the Satellites, trends in Sino-Soviet relations, trends in the internal political and ideological climate in the USSR, the Soviet view of the "threat" from abroad, economic trends and potential, and trends in Soviet strategic concepts.

<sup>\*</sup> The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, reserves his position on the problem posed and on the time allowed for consideration of this paper.

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We do not believe that it is possible, particularly in view of the January target date, to probe far into the ramifications of these factors. Rather we shall have to assume that no great change occurs in the international scene, Sino-Soviet relations, relations with the Satellites, or in Soviet society. We shall also assume a continuing Soviet economic growth at realistic rates, and an economic-technological context capable of supporting very substantial military programs.

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

## I. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS

Are there any respects in which our general assumptions, as described above, are likely to be invalid? Can one confidently foresee any political, economic, or ideological developments which will exert a decisive influence on the Soviet military posture during the next decade? Any developments in strategic doctrine?

## II. TRENDS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

A. What is the likely course of development of the most important weapons which are already in existence -- ICBMs and other offensive missiles, manned aircraft, BW and CW, others?

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- B. What new weapons or other technological innovations of military significance are likely to appear antimissile missiles, space vehicles, etc., etc.? Reconnaissance satellites, and other possible warning devices? What are the chances of a technical breakthrough which could basically change world power relation—ships?
- C. Assuming either a ban on or resumption of nuclear testing, what advances are likely in regard to efficiency in the use of nuclear materials or new weapons applications?
- D. What is the probable strategic significance of the above developments? What is likely to be the balance between offensive and defensive weapons? Can anything useful be said about limited war during the period of the estimate?

## III. THE QUESTION OF MILITARY STRENGTHS

- A. Are there any categories of weapons, or of other military strengths, for which definite numbers can justifiably be given?

  If so, what is the justification?
- B. How far will economic considerations limit the number of weapons which the Soviet can possess?

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